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O

N Independence Day, July 4, 1966, President Lyndon Baines Johnson (LBJ) signed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) into law.1
Announcing the occasion from his “Texas White House” outside San
Antonio, LBJ explained: “[t]his legislation springs from one of our most
essential principles: a democracy works best when the people have all the
information that the security of the nation permits.”2 Unfortunately, the
press release’s pro-transparency sentiment was mostly atmospheric window
dressing. The foul-mouthed LBJ privately despised FOIA and signed “the
f——— thing,” as he called it, only with much cajoling and at the last
moment possible, narrowly avoiding its pocket veto.3 That LBJ signed the
bill at all overshadowed his qualified embrace of it. Congress exempted
only nine categories of agency records from FOIA disclosure and limited
withholding to these grounds,4 but LBJ’s bill signing statement claimed a
tenth ground—a presidential, constitutional power to “provide for confidentiality” and resist FOIA whenever “national interest so requires,” as de* Professor of Law, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law. The
Villanova Law Review’s 2017 FOIA symposium was made possible by the generosity
of Norman J. Shachoy and the Charles Koch Foundation. I thank Peter Herrick
and Jacqueline Kramer for their research assistance in preparing this essay, which
is based on introductory remarks I gave during the symposium. My special thanks
go to Valerie Caras, Jason Kurtyka, Jourdan Simko, and their editorial team for
their execution of the symposium, as well as to their successors for their work
preparing the symposium for publication.
1. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2018)).
2. Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Revising Public Information
Provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 2 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 895,
896 (July 11, 1966) [hereinafter Statement by the President].
3. See MICHAEL R. LEMOV, PEOPLE’S WARRIOR: JOHN MOSS AND THE FIGHT FOR
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND CONSUMERS RIGHTS 67-68 (2011) (quoting LBJ press
secretary Bill Moyers, Address to the Society of Professional Journalists, JOURNALISM
UNDER FIRE (Sept. 11, 2004), https://www.commondreams.org/views/2004/09/
17/journalism-under-fire [https://perma.cc/C7G6-QSBH]).
4. § 3(f), 80 Stat. at 251.
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fined by the President.5 Nonetheless, even so qualified, the President
signed the bill.
Commentators often credit 1966 as FOIA’s debut,6 but 1967 better
suits the occasion. First, Congress postponed the original FOIA’s effective
date for one year from its enactment to enable agency implementation of
(and compliance with) the new law.7 Second, shortly before the originally
enacted FOIA’s July 4, 1967 effective date, Congress and LBJ repealed the
earlier statute and enacted a substitute FOIA statute on June 5, 1967, replacing the 1966 enactment but with a law taking effect on the same date.8
The changes supposedly were stylistic only,9 but at least one was substantive.10 Still, a freedom of information law did take effect in 1967 and commenced an American experiment in governmental transparency and
compliance.
In retrospect, it can fairly be said that LBJ’s reluctant embrace of
FOIA foreshadowed how the executive branch would come to implement
the law during its first five decades. Congress, which predictably excluded
itself from FOIA’s terms, has repeatedly amended the law to strengthen it
as a cattle prod to secure executive branch compliance. Perhaps this congressional hypocrisy—call it “transparency for thee, but not for me”—was
not lost on the judiciary. Illiberal judicial interpretations of the remedial
statute, particularly from the pro-executive D.C. Circuit,11 have necessi5. Statement by the President, supra note 2, at 895. Echoes of this tenth ground
may be heard in contemporary presidential administrations’ claims that agencies
should attend to “White House equities” and allow White House review of agency
records prior to release. See, e.g., Memorandum from Gregory Craig, Counsel to
the President to all Executive Department and Agency General Counsels, Reminder
Regarding Document Requests (Apr. 15, 2009) (“[E]xecutive agencies should consult
with the White House Counsel’s Office on all document requests that may involve
documents with White House equities . . . including . . . FOIA requests.”).
6. See, e.g., Steve Zansberg, July 4, 1966: Birth of the FOIA - A Look Back, 32
COMM. LAW. 34 (2016) (celebrating 1966 as birth of modern FOIA).
7. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 12 (1966).
8. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (1967) (codifying Pub. L. 89-487 at 5 U.S.C. § 552 with minor amendments).
9. “The purpose of this bill is to incorporate into title 5 of the United States
Code, without substantive change, the provisions of Public Law 89-487.” S. REP. NO.
90-248, at 1196 (1967) (emphasis added).
10. For example, the 1967 bill exploited the classic distinction between “officers” and low-level “employees” to limit supervisory officer liability for disobeying
a court’s order in a FOIA case. See, e.g., United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508
(1878) (interpreting federal criminal statute to extend criminal liability only to
“officers,” but not “employees”). The 1966 bill extended contempt sanctions to
“the responsible officers,” 80 Stat. at 251, suggesting sanction power could reach
malfeasant supervisors, not just line employees. In the 1967 bill, however, Congress authorized contempt power only for “the responsible employee,” 81 Stat. at 55
(emphasis added), limiting liability to low-level line employees, excluding supervisory officers.
11. Professor Cass Sunstein characterized the D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudence as
embodying a pro-executive, “national security fundamentalism” that infects its
FOIA jurisprudence. Cass Sunstein, National Security, Liberty, and the D.C. Circuit, 73
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693, 697 (2005).
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tated multiple abrogating amendments over time.12 Executive branch
gaming of FOIA has also animated Congress as it has checked executive
efforts to minimize, evade, or outright defeat FOIA’s pro-disclosure
objective.13
As amended, today’s FOIA is easily the most robust of the American
federal transparency statutes,14 but its actual operation is far more involved than its name—“freedom of information”—suggests. The “Federal
Agency Open Records Act” might have better captured the law’s actual
function, i.e. if requesters know what federal executive agency records to
look for and request them with sufficient specificity, then they might just
have a shot at accessing them, assuming the records still exist and no exclusion or exemption applies. Thus, the law does not oblige a FOIA officer to “free” information from specific records, for example, by creating
a new record that answers inquiries in FOIA requests.15 And, FOIA is in12. See, e.g., FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-185, 130 Stat.
538, 539-40 (2016) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2016)) (sunsetting
Exemption 5 deliberative process privilege claims following Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s opinion in National Security Archive v. CIA, 752 F.3d 460 (D.C. Cir.
2014)); Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National Government Act of
2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, § 4(a)(2), 121 Stat. 2524, 2525 (2007) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552) (abrogating narrow view of “prevailing party” adopted
in Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and
Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001)); Electronic FOIA Amendments of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-231, § 7(c), 110 Stat. 3048, 3051 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(6)(C)) (narrowing Open America v. Watergate Special Prosecution
Force, 547 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1976), definition of “exceptional circumstances”
that excused agency delay in processing FOIA requests).
13. A high-profile example of an obstructionist tactic includes federal personnel using private email accounts and servers to defeat searches of agency email
accounts and servers for records potentially responsive to requests. See, e.g., Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Department of State, 285 F.Supp.3d 249, 251 (D.D.C. 2018)
(seeking Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s emails concerning use of private digital devices). In 2014, Congress amended the Federal Records Act to close this
loophole. Presidential and Federal Records Act Amendments of 2014, Pub. L. No.
113-187, 128 Stat. 2003, 2006 (2014) (codifying amendment at 44 U.S.C. § 2209);
see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (requiring release of “reasonably segregable portion of a
record” in response to agency practice of withholding entire records where only
portion warranted withholding).
14. Beyond FOIA, there are many federal statutes designed to promote transparency and accountability. See, e.g., Digital Accountability and Transparency Act
of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-101, 128 Stat. 1146 (2014) (establishing data standards for
agency reported information); Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (requiring agency meetings to be open for public observation and imposing procedural requirements to ensure advance notice before
they occur); Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770
(1972) (opening operation of presidential advisory committees to public).
15. N.L.R.B. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 161-62 (1975) (“The Act
does not compel agencies to write opinions in cases in which they would not otherwise be required to do so.”); Hudgins v. I.R.S., 620 F. Supp. 19, 21 (D.D.C. 1985)
(“FOIA neither requires an agency to answer questions disguised as a FOIA request . . . or to create documents or opinions in response to an individual’s request
for information.” (citing NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 162
(1975)).
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applicable to legislative or judicial records, except for those records that
the executive branch comes to obtain.16 Further, FOIA does not even
cover all records within the executive branch. It provides requesters with
judicial relief only for “agency records,”17 not presidential records.18
This request-based FOIA regime has enabled requesters—American
and foreign—to attempt to learn what agencies of the U.S. executive
branch have been “up to,”19 at least insofar as these activities happen to be
memorialized in “agency records.”20 Of course, what agencies release is
subject to three exceptions21 and nine exemptions22 that represent finelytuned, congressional policy judgments about the proper balance between
transparency and competing considerations, such as national security,23
personal privacy,24 and promoting candor in deliberative records.25
After 50 years of operation, 1967–2017, the 2017 Norman J. Shachoy
Symposium reviewed years of hard-earned experience—a vast body of requests and their resulting treatment—to consider how FOIA in the wild
may depart from the regime described on cold pages found within a law
library. The operations questions include: (1) what unforeseen developments have changed the law’s operation-in-fact, including the rise of commercial requesters,26 the first-person requester,27 ideologically-motivated
requesters,28 and the press plaintiff,29 even at a time of declining funding
16. U.S. Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136, 146 (1989).
17. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2018). Congress has defined “agency” and “record” for FOIA purposes. 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1)–(2) (2018).
18. A separate statute governs the handling and release of presidential
records. Presidential Records Act of 1978, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-09.
19. U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press, 489
U.S. 749, 750, 780 (1989).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(A)–(E) (2018).
21. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(8)(A)(i)–(ii).
22. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
24. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(6)-(7)(C).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).
26. Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361, 1379–1414 (2016) (detailing heavy use of FOIA by commercial requesters, such as information resellers).
27. Margaret B. Kwoka, First-Person FOIA, 127 YALE L.J. 2204, 2220–43 (2018)
(detailing that FOIA requests from individuals seeking records about themselves
dominate FOIA logs at seven agencies that deal with benefits and immigration
enforcement).
28. The conservative non-profit Judicial Watch dominates the FOIA docket of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, appearing so frequently as
plaintiff that its name has become an almost useless search delimiter. See, e.g.,
Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 293 F. Supp. 3d 124, 126 (D.D.C. 2018)
(seeking FBI records regarding intelligence operative who prepared dossier on
Trump); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 271 F. Supp. 3d 264, 266
(D.D.C. 2017) (seeking records related to settlement discussions in suit brought by
House committee to enforce subpoena for documents related to the “Fast and
Furious” operation); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 282 F. Supp. 3d
242, 246 (D.D.C. 2017) (seeking FBI records relating to interviews with high-level
officials concerning former governor convicted for corruption).
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for investigative journalism; (2) what tactics requesters and agency personnel deploy to navigate the regime and how the law might be shaped to
respond; (3) how the courts narrowly or liberally implement FOIA; (4)
how innovations like administrative alternative dispute resolution might
spare agencies and requesters lengthy delays and expense; and (5) how do
regimes, beyond the American federal one, promote transparency?
More fundamental than these operations questions is the first principles inquiry and its presumed response: “Why does the public really need
a freedom of information law?” and the answer that transparency promotes “hold[ing] the governors accountable to the governed.”30 To test
this oft-repeated accountability rationale, consider the handling of two sets
of records touching on the powers of war and peace—whether FOIA adequately achieves its purpose, at least in light of the law’s narrow scope,
extensively asserted exemptions, and the potent defense of delay:
1. In 1998, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) released the
notorious March 1962 Operation Northwoods memorandum together with the accompanying Operation Mongoose memorandum.31 These ghastly memoranda reveal that DOD aimed to
deceive the American public and trick it into supporting a “defensive” war against Cuba by staging terrorist attacks in Washington, D.C. and Miami, Florida.32 What would these memoranda,
released 36 years too late for any public accountability, have
meant for the professional future of General Lyman Lemnitzer,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who signed the recommendations, and who absent public disclosure, was subsequently
appointed to be Supreme Allied Commander in Europe in November 1962?33 The records, which pre-dated FOIA, but could
29. See Susan B. Long & Harry Hammitt, Increased Use of the Freedom of Information Act by the Media: Exploring What Took the Media So Long, 63 VILL. L. REV. 895, 897
(2018).
30. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (invoking
grandiose purpose of FOIA in case rejecting use of FOIA as “private discovery tool”
seeking witness statements).
31. Memorandum from Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff L.L. Lemnitzer for the
Secretary of Defense, Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba 1 (Mar. 13,
1962) (forwarding “pretexts” that “would provide justification for US military intervention in Cuba”) (on file with Villanova Law Review); Report by the Department
of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative on the Caribbean Survey Group
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Cuba Project 2 (Mar. 9, 1962) (“It is recognized that
any action which becomes pretext for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to
a political decision which then would lead to military action.”) (on file with Villanova Law Review) [hereinafter Operation Mongoose]. The Assassination Records Review Board released these records under special statutory authority, not FOIA. See
President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-526, 106 Stat. 3443 (1992) (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (2014).
32. Operation Mongoose, supra note 31, at 8–9.
33. Lemnitzer, Lyman L. (Lyman Louis), 1899 – 1988 Person Authority Record,
NAT’L ARCHIVES CATALOG, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/10572177 [Permalink
unavailable] (last visited Aug. 5, 2018).
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have been requested on July 4, 1967, would have been subject to,
inter alia, the national security exemption and deliberative process privilege. They were released only decades after the events
with special supplemental statutory authority. Might earlier disclosure of the proposed warmongering deceit have promoted a
more probing and skeptical inquiry of America’s escalating involvement in Vietnam? After all, it was not long after, in August
1964, that LBJ asked Congress to vote for the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution,34 a blank check authorizing military force, precipitated by dubious DOD reports of an alleged North Vietnamese
attack against the USS Maddox.35
2. Multiple classified FBI records detailed Saudi royal family involvement in the funding and execution of the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks.36 What if these records, covered by national security Exemption 1, among other exemptions, were released when completed in January 2003, two months in advance
of the Iraq war, rather than over 13 years later in July 2016?37
These records suggested a state actor sponsored and supported
al-Qaeda in an act of war. Under the Bush doctrine, where “any
nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime,”38 Saudi Arabia,
much more than Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, was connected to the
9/11 attacks and would have been deemed a “hostile regime.”
In both cases, delay in disclosure, together with the operation of exemptions, blunted accountability. Acknowledged release of authenticated
34. Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964) (repealed 1971).
35. See, e.g., Lieutenant Commander Pat Paterson, The Truth About Tonkin, 22
NAVAL HIST. MAG., Feb. 2008, https://www.usni.org/magazines/navalhistory/
2008-02/truth-about-tonkin [https://perma.cc/2X5R-EU6E] (concluding Secretary of Defense McNamara distorted facts to mislead Congress into believing there
had been a second attack); Robert J. Hanyok, Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of
Tonkin Mystery 2-4 August 1964, CRYPTOLOGICAL Q. 1, 49 (2001), https://nsarchive2
.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB132/relea00012.pdf [https://perma.cc/HG4E-TZ67]
(concluding, based on signals intelligence records, August 4, 1964 attack on the
USS Maddox never occurred and was part of deliberate effort to mislead).
36. U.S. S. Select Comm. Intelligence & U.S. H. Permanent Select Comm.
Intelligence, J. Inquiry Intelligence Community Activities and Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, 2001 H.R. REP. NO. 107-792, pt. 4 (2002), https://intelligence
.house.gov/uploadedfiles/declasspart4.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZ7Q-PWUA]
(summarizing FBI findings of Saudi involvement).
37. See Press Release, U.S. H. Permanent Select Comm. Intelligence, Intel Committee publishes declassified “28 pages” (July 15, 2016), https://intelligence.house
.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx? DocumentID=676 [Permalink unavailable].
38. George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,
THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 20, 2001, 9:00 PM), https://georgewbush-whitehouse
.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html [https://perma.cc/
ND8L-P5FG].
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federal records might have precipitated very different public reactions,
prompted deeper inquiries about proposed courses of agency action, and
undermined what have now become accepted narratives. In fact, untimely
release encourages the public to favor the critically unexamined, first-intime, “well-known-fact” and to reject or minimize the later-in-time inconvenient, or even unsavory, disclosure as part of a dissonance reducing
rationalization.39
Nonetheless, we must also recognize that transparency entails its own
particular set of risks, including the unintended consequence of promoting the darkest portions of our country’s history. What gets publicized
from FOIA disclosure is usually bad news—malfeasance, inefficiency, neglect of duty, misdemeanors low and high—more than occasionally sought
to “harass and embarrass” agencies.40 Further, the theory-ladenness that
informs press FOIA requests—“if it bleeds, it leads”41—motivates FOIA requesters to dog pile an agency in seeking records about already publicized
or suggested controversy.42 On the one hand, these disclosures may well
damage governmental legitimacy.43 On the other hand, FOIA may provide Americans with a helpful tool for appraising our government’s function, not just a muck rake for sowing doubt and insurrection. Regardless
and regrettably, what is lost in this digging is what should be clear on the
surface: many good men and women labor tirelessly in the service of the
country to promote the general welfare. Their good work goes relatively
unreported in the unrequested, quotidian agency record.
Our 2017 Norman J. Shachoy FOIA Symposium aimed to explore different aspects of the landmark transparency law through five thematic
panels. During our first panel, Professors Susan Long and Margaret
Kwoka provided empirical context for the FOIA’s function in a discussion
39. Cf. AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: PROPIVOTAL THEORY IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 4-5 (Eddie Harmon-Jones &
Judson Mills eds. 1999).
40. David E. Pozen, Freedom of Information Beyond the Freedom of Information Act,
165 U. PA. L. REV. 1097, 1127–28 (2017).
41. Eric Pooley, Grins, Gore, and Videotape - The Trouble with Local TV News, N.Y.
MAG., Oct. 9, 1989, at 36; Pozen, supra note 40, at 1132 (noting study of period
October 1999-September 2000 revealed that 25% of stories referencing FOIA
“deal[t] with wrongdoing, embarrassing information, and administrative incompetence” (quoting Bruce E. Cain et al., Towards More Open Democracies: The Expansion
of Freedom of Information Laws, in DEMOCRACY TRANSFORMED? EXPANDING POLITICAL
OPPORTUNITIES IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES 115, 135 (Bruce E. Cain et
al. eds., 2003)).
42. FOIA Project Staff, FOIA Lawsuits Mirror News Headlines in FY 2016, FOIA
PROJECT (Dec. 9, 2016), http://foiaproject.org/2016/12/09/foia-lawsuits-makenews-headlines-in-fy-2016/ [https://perma.cc/VY24-AMN3] (reporting that
“[r]eporters and news organizations sought records about government policies
and practices to probe further behind the headlines, and to create new headlines
of their own”).
43. Pozen, supra note 40, at 1131 (characterizing press reporting based on
FOIA as communicating “relentless, and distorted, narrative of bureaucratic
failure”).
GRESS ON A
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moderated by Professor Suzanne Piotrowski. Professor Long’s article with
co-author Harry Hammitt, Increased Use of the Freedom of Information Act by
the Media: Exploring What Took the Media So Long, provides a data-driven
examination of FOIA’s use by the media.44 Long and Hammitt document
record-setting levels of litigation brought by press litigants, which represents a dramatic increase from the Press’s historically conspicuous absence
from the list of top FOIA requesters and litigants.45 Why the change?
Long and Hammitt explain that congressional amendments have favored
news organizations as requesters by providing explicit fee exemptions.46
Taken together with political developments such as aggressive government
assertions of secrecy and journalists increasingly suing in their individual
capacities, media FOIA litigation has exploded.47 Professor Kwoka’s presentation, sounding themes in her scholarship,48 described the unintended
requesters who have come to dominate FOIA’s operation—commercial
and first person requesters. These requesters do not advance the core
purpose of FOIA—advancing the public’s interest.
During our second panel on “The Press, the Academy, and FOIA,”
the Villanova Law Review was privileged to hear from David McCraw, Deputy General Counsel, New York Times; Jason Leopold, Senior Investigative
Reporter, BuzzFeed News; and David Barrett, Professor of Political Science, Villanova University. Their discussion canvassed a variety of major
new headlines involving FOIA records, including former Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton’s e-mail server, Iraq war reporting, and Trump tweets inadvertently acknowledging classified records. McCraw discussed his work
handling FOIA litigation for the New York Times. He particularly noted the
advantages of suing under the FOIA, including getting to the front of the
line to address agency delay and the concomitant advantage of getting
one’s requests handled by a Justice Department attorney acting as a concierge in securing agency compliance with FOIA. Leopold shared his experiences as a new media government records journalist with a lengthy list of
FOIA lawsuits to his name. The lawsuits, he explained, are necessary to
get his record requests addressed, particularly in the face of agency FOIA
processes that characterize his requests as “complex.” Barrett, a historian
by practice, offered his perspective as a recent academic plaintiff in Barrett
v. CIA, where he successfully sued the Agency for release of volume 5 of
the history of the Bay of Pigs operation.49 He advised that if you want to

44. 63 VILL. L. REV. 895 (2018).
45. Id. at 897.
46. Id. at 900–04.
47. Id. at 897, 903.
48. See Kwoka, supra notes 26–27.
49. Barrett v. CIA, Order Pl.’s Mot. Att’y Fees, No. 2:16-cv-04279 (E.D. Pa. July
28, 2017) (recognizing Barrett as prevailing party that catalyzed CIA’s release of
draft Volume 5 and awarding him fees).
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get the CIA to release records, “get a lawyer.” A transcript of the lively
panel discussion, moderated by myself, is included in this issue.50
Our third panel turned to the federal system of checks and balances
and the use of FOIA to effect congressional oversight of the executive
branch.51 Professor Catherine Lanctot, Villanova Law, moderated a discussion between Aram Gavoor, Visiting Associate Professor of Law, George
Washington University Law School, and Katy Rother, Senior Counsel, U.S.
House of Representatives. Gavoor characterized FOIA as an important
force multiplier for the public interest with the general public as deputized requesters that aid the House and Senate oversight committees. For
her part, Katy Rother noted the inadequate staffing on the Oversight, Government, Reform (OGR) committee to cover the entirety of the federal
government. She observed the important role news media and FOIA advocacy groups play in ferreting out information that allows the House
OGR to investigate flagged concerns more deeply with its own constitutional tools, including subpoena authority.
In Volume 63, Issue 5, the Villanova Law Review has published a transcript of our Shachoy Symposium’s fourth panel on “Resolving FOIA disputes.” That panel featured a distinguished cross-section of the FOIA bar:
Alina Semo, Director of the Office of Government Information Services
(OGIS), who mediates requester disputes with agencies and assures
agency compliance; Michael Bekesha, an experienced staff attorney with
conservative FOIA requester Judicial Watch; Marcia Berman, Assistant Director, Federal Programs Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, who coordinates the defense of the most important and sensitive
FOIA actions litigated in the U.S. district courts; and panel moderator
Margaret Kwoka, now law professor at the University of Denver and former FOIA litigator for the progressive advocacy organization Public Citizen. The panel began with Director Semo discussing the OGIS alternative
dispute resolution mechanism and its voluntary, facilitative mediation. In
2016, that part of OGIS’s portfolio was dramatically expanded to FOIA
disputes arising at any point during the FOIA administrative process.52
Director Semo’s article elaborates on her live presentation of the past, present, and future of the “federal FOIA Ombudsman” and discusses OGIS’s
mediation, compliance, and advisory opinion functions.53 For his part,
50. A video recording of this second panel is available at https://www.you
tube.com/watch?v=sFZUUHBYcXM&list=PL_Z9mt0HJeskbWI0npsM6pWaF_5cVP
YqV&index=3&t=0s [https://perma.cc/9HS4-XHAX].
51. A video recording of the third panel is available at https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=l3loJLl6Njk&list=PL_Z9mt0HJeskbWI0npsM6pWaF_5cVPYqV&in
dex=4&t=0s [https://perma.cc/8WJZ-BC59].
52. FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-185, 130 Stat. 538, 539-40
(2016). The new law authorizes OGIS involvement in mediation as soon as there is
an adverse determination, even prior to exhaustion of agency remedies. 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(6)(A)(i)(III)(bb).
53. Alina M. Semo & Sheela Portonovo, OGIS—Creating a FOIA Process That
Works for All, 63 VILL. L. REV. 959 (2018).
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Michael Bekesha offered a perspective from the requester bar. FOIA litigation prompts agencies to comply, effectively providing litigants with
“court supervised production” when agencies fail to respond to calls or
inquiries.54 Assistant Director Berman noted that FOIA litigation now accounts for 40% of the D.C. district court’s civil docket where advocacy
groups on “both sides of the political aisle” use it as “a political weapon.”55
The panelists and moderator engaged a number of litigation-reform-related topics, including agency delay, unreasonably short statutorily mandated response times, inadequate agency resources, information
asymmetry in FOIA litigation, and FOIA procedural exceptionalism.
Our fifth and final panel considered the future of FOIA specifically
and transparency generally. Congress was an innovator and leader in the
transparency field at the time of FOIA’s enactment but now many jurisdictions have transparency laws, from the fifty states and their little FOIAs to
different countries from around the world. What can we learn from
others’ experiments and experiences? What innovations have others pioneered that might be transplanted into the American context? Fran
Burns, Professor of Practice, in Villanova University’s Department of Public Administration moderated a wide-ranging discussion of the approaches
different jurisdictions are taking to transparency. Croatian Commissioner
of Information and law professor Anamarija Musa provided a European
and European Union perspective on promoting transparency. Panelist
Professor Suzanne Piotrowski addressed the impact that the open government agenda, such as the Open Government Partnership espouses, is having on traditional freedom of information regimes. Freedom of
information regimes, focused on transparency and accountability, contrast
with open government regimes and their emphasis not only on these
goals, but also public participation and the use of technology to promote
data analysis and efficient government. Piotrowski’s observations about
the two transparency tools and their relative merits are elaborated in her
article published in this issue.56 Also in this issue, Professor Richard PeltzSteele questions the assumption that access to information should be limited to access to government information.57 Instead, he observes that the
accretion of power in private hands, often with private institutions fulfilling public functions, casts doubt on attempted line drawing between public and private.58 Invoking South Africa’s example, Peltz-Steele proposes a
right to access information maintained by non-governmental actors.59 These
54. Resolving FOIA Disputes, 63 VILL. L. REV. 995, 1001 (2018).
55. Id. at 1003.
56. Daniel Berliner, Alex Ingrams & Suzanne J. Piotrowski, The Future of FOIA
in an Open Government World: Implications of the Open Government Agenda for Freedom of
Information Policy and Implementation, 63 VILL. L. REV. 867 (2018).
57. Richard Peltz-Steele, Access to Information in the Private Sector: African Inspiration for U.S. FOIA Reform, 63 VILL. L. REV. 907 (2018).
58. Id. at 955.
59. Id. at 951–52.
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insights suggest new avenues for FOIA reformers to consider as the law
enters its next fifty years of operation.
Our five symposium panels canvass a variety of issues raised about
FOIA’s operation in its first fifty years. The panelists have demonstrated
how FOIA can effectively operate as a transparency tool when motivated
requesters employ the powerful tools it provides. Like most legislative enactments, however, FOIA has its limitations, oversights, and unanticipated
uses, which become apparent in discussing its operation. Our hope is that
our symposium issue may contribute to a good government dialogue to
improve FOIA, so it may function effectively for another fifty years.
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